We Must, Therefore, Be Confident That The

Lastly, The Great Uncertainty Of All Data In War Is A Peculiar Difficulty, Because All Action Must, To A Certain Extent, Be Planned In A Mere Twilight, Which In Addition Not Unfrequently — Like The Effect Of A Fog Or Moonshine — Gives To Things Exaggerated Dimensions And An Unnatural Appearance.

What Do We Mean By The Defeat Of The Enemy? Simply The Destruction Of His Forces, Whether By Death, Injury, Or Any Other Means-either Completely Or Enough To Make Him Stop Fighting. . . . The Complete Or Partial Destruction Of The Enemy Must Be Regarded As The Sole Object Of All Engagements. . . . Direct Annihilation Of The Enemy's Forces Must Always Be The Dominant Consideration.

Our Knowledge Of Circumstances Has Increased, But Our Uncertainty, Instead Of Having Diminished, Has Only Increased. The Reason Of This Is, That We Do Not Gain All Our Experience At Once, But By Degrees; So Our Determinations Continue To Be Assailed Incessantly By Fresh Experience; And The Mind, If We May Use The Expression, Must Always Be Under Arms.

War Is Politics By Other Means.

However Much Pains May Be Taken To Combine The Soldier And The Citizen In One And The Same Individual, Whatever May Be Done To Nationalize Wars, Never Will It Be Possible To Do Away With The Professionalism Of The Business; And If That Cannot Be Done, Then Those Who Belong To It Will Always Look Upon Themselves As A Kind Of Guild, In The Regulations, Laws, And Customs In Which The "spirit Of War" Finds Its Expression. It Would Be Very Wrong To Look Down Upon This Corporate Spirit, Or Esprit De Corps, Which May And Should Exist More Or Less In Every Army.