It Is A Just Observation That The

Passive Commerce . . . Should Thus . . . [compel Us] To Content Ourselves With The First Price Of Our Commodities, And To See The Profits Of Our Trade Snatched From Us, To Enrich Our Enemies And Persecutors. That Unequalled Spirit Of Enterprise . . . An Inexhaustible Mine Of National Wealth, Would Be Stifled And Lost; And Poverty And Disgrace Would Overspread A Country, Which, With Wisdom, Might Make Herself The Admiration And Envy Of The World.

If The End Be Clearly Comprehended Within Any Of The Specified Powers, And If The Measure Have An Obvious Relation To That End, And Is Not Forbidden By Any Particular Provision Of The Constitution, It May Safely Be Deemed To Come Within The Compass Of The National Authority.

Nothing Can Be More Evident, Than That An Exclusive Power Of Regulating Elections For The National Government, In The Hands Of The State Legislatures, Would Leave The Existence Of The Union Entirely At Their Mercy . . . . It Is To Little Purpose To Say That A Neglect Or Omission Of This Kind [not Letting The Feds Have Elections], Would Be Unlikely To Take Place. The Constitutional Possibility Of The Thing, Without An Equivalent For The Risk, Is An Unanswerable Objection.

No Character, However Upright, Is A Match For Constantly Reiterated Attacks, However False.

Good Constitutions Are Formed Upon A Comparison Of The Liberty Of The Individual With The Strength Of Government: If The Tone Of Either Be Too High, The Other Will Be Weakened Too Much. It Is The Happiest Possible Mode Of Conciliating These Objects, To Institute One Branch Peculiarly Endowed With Sensibility, Another With Knowledge And Firmness. Through The Opposition And Mutual Control Of These Bodies, The Government Will Reach, In Its Regular Operations, The Perfect Balance Between Liberty And Power.